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Advancing the “Right” to Counsel
in Removal Proceedings
Matt Adams
INTRODUCTION
Persons inside the United States who are placed in removal proceedings
(formerly known as deportation proceedings) potentially face both the threat
of prolonged custody as well as forcible expulsion from the country, which
often results in permanent separation from family and home. The
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which governs these proceedings,
has a statute providing for the “Right to Counsel.” However, the statute
makes clear that persons are only entitled to legal representation when they
are fortuitous enough to retain counsel at “no expense to the government.”1
Given this law, only those who can afford to retain a private attorney, or
have the good fortune to obtain pro bono counsel, receive legal
representation. The rest are forced to forge through the complex
immigration system without an attorney. Consequently, the majority of
persons charged as deportable (who are referred to as “respondents” in
removal proceedings) are obligated to stand alone in immigration court.
Even though the majority of respondents are unrepresented, removal
proceedings are extremely adversarial: in each case, the respondent must
face off against a U.S. trial attorney, who is advocating that the immigration
judge order his or her removal from the United States.2
Federal courts have repeatedly acknowledged the complexity of removal
proceedings and the plight of individuals who are forced to defend
themselves without legal representation.3 It is, by no means, an easy feat to
successfully maneuver this morass even with experienced legal
representation. Despite the enormous interests that are at stake in removal
proceedings, and notwithstanding the indisputable adversarial nature of
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these complex proceedings, where the respondents are opposed by
experienced U.S. trial attorneys trained on the intricacies of immigration
law, the respondents are not entitled to assigned counsel.
While the INA does not provide for appointed counsel at government
expense, established case law from the Supreme Court—providing a
constitutional basis for asserting the right to appointed counsel in other
fields—lays out a roadmap for advocates to follow in challenges to removal
proceedings. Up until the present date, case law has been relatively scarce
with regard to the specific challenges of seeking assigned counsel in the
context of immigration proceedings. What little case law there is at least
acknowledges the opportunity to seek appointed counsel on a case-by-case
basis. This must serve as a starting point. The current system, especially
with regard to those who are detained during removal proceedings, is
simply inadequate as it fails to provide the respondents with a
fundamentally fair hearing.

I. THE IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF REMOVAL
PROCEEDINGS
Loss of liberty through immigration custody must be a primary factor in
any analysis regarding the right to appointed counsel in removal
proceedings. Most respondents are detained during the removal
proceedings.4 Some detained respondents are eligible to request a bond
hearing before the immigration judge to determine if they can either obtain
an initial bond or have their bond reduced so as to avoid incarceration
during this lengthy process.5 Again, at each bond hearing, the detained
respondents must face off against a U.S. trial attorney who is opposing their
request. For some respondents, a successful bond hearing will allow them to
avoid literally years of detention during protracted removal proceedings.6
However, there is much more at risk than this immediate loss of liberty.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the broad range of fundamental
liberty interests at stake in deportation proceedings. In discussing the
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government’s efforts to denaturalize individuals and subject them to
deportation, Justice Brandeis famously opined ninety years ago that such an
action “may result also in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes
life worth living.”7 Those who are ordered deported will be banished from
this country and, as a result, will lose their homes, property, employment,
and often any possibility of continuing with their livelihood. 8
In addition, many persons will be permanently separated from family,
loved ones, and friends. Respondents include persons who have lawfully
resided in this country for decades, including those married to U.S. citizens
and those who have U.S. citizen children. The overwhelming majority of
persons ordered removed will never qualify to be readmitted. Thus, unless
their family members are able to leave their own jobs, education, and other
family members in order relocate with them to the foreign country, they
face permanent separation from their loved ones.
Other respondents have just arrived to the United States after fleeing their
countries of origin to escape various forms of persecution and now face the
risk of being forcibly returned to the very governments that previously
ordered their imprisonment and often torture. In light of these recurrent
factors, the Supreme Court has long recognized that deportation results in a
severe penalty that affects core rights:
Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it
visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the
right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That
deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be
doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by
which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards
of fairness.9

II. VAST NUMBERS OF PRO SE RESPONDENTS
In light of the liberties at stake and the complexity of the immigration
system, it is striking that most respondents must appear pro se as they are
unable to retain a private attorney. The percentages of respondents who are
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forced through the process without legal representation vary slightly
throughout the country, but the numbers processed by the Seattle and
Tacoma immigration courts make clear that the majority of respondents are
obliged to defend themselves in immigration proceedings. For the last
calendar year reported (2008), 10,211 cases were completed in Seattle and
Tacoma; and, of those, almost 70 percent (7,220 individuals) were forced to
appear unrepresented in removal proceedings.10
Closer examination reveals the extent to which detention limits an
individual’s opportunity to obtain legal representation. The majority of
respondents in removal proceedings, more than 65 percent, were detained.
Of those who were detained, more than 90 percent were unrepresented. On
the other hand, those who were not placed in custody during their
proceedings were able to obtain legal representation in almost 68 percent of
the cases.11

III. CASE LAW ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: FROM
CRIMINAL TO CIVIL
Over the last forty-five years, developments in case law have created a
now familiar legal framework for determining whether an indigent person
in custody or facing deprivation of liberty is entitled to assigned counsel.
The landmark case, Gideon v. Wainwright,12 clearly established the general
right to assigned counsel for all indigent persons in criminal proceedings
facing deprivation of physical liberty. Soon thereafter, in a case examining
whether a juvenile in delinquency proceedings was entitled to counsel, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the right to court appointed counsel may
extend beyond criminal proceedings.13 That case, In Re Gault, established a
per se rule that juveniles in delinquency proceedings who were at risk of
confinement were entitled to court-appointed counsel under the due process
clause, even though they were not in criminal proceedings and, thus, did not
enjoy the same Sixth Amendment protections relied on by the Court in
Gideon.
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However, fifteen years later, the Supreme Court took a dramatically
different approach in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham
County, a decision addressing whether an indigent parent facing termination
of her parental rights was entitled to a court-appointed attorney.14 Instead of
determining whether all similarly situated individuals were categorically
entitled to assigned counsel under a per se rule, the Court announced a caseby-case approach, applying the three-pronged balancing test of Mathews v.
Eldridge (balancing the private interests at stake, the government’s
interests, and the risk of error in the absence of assigned counsel).15 In
announcing this case-by-case approach, as opposed to a per se rule, the
Court held that there is a “presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to
appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may be deprived of his
physical liberty.”16
Following Lassiter, courts have generally determined that the cases
before them required the case-by-case approach. Thus, courts have applied
the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge in deciding whether to appoint
counsel to indigent persons in civil proceedings, rather than recognizing a
per se rule that would categorically provide appointed counsel. Nonetheless,
Lassiter’s reiteration that a presumption to appointed counsel exists in
situations where persons are faced with deprivation of physical liberty
reinforces forceful arguments in support of a per se rule for most persons in
removal proceedings. The arguments are strengthened when focusing on
detained respondents and other subgroups, such as unaccompanied children
and mentally incompetent respondents, who clearly demonstrate an inability
to represent themselves in an adversarial judicial system. Regardless of
which approach is found applicable for persons in removal proceedings, it is
readily apparent that there are compelling arguments for providing
appointed counsel to indigent respondents.
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IV. THE NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
REQUIRE APPOINTED COUNSEL
As previously noted, the majority of persons placed in removal
proceedings are deprived of their liberty. The detained respondents are
generally held at county jails contracted by the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”), or they are placed in one of nearly a dozen monolithic
immigration prisons spread across the country, operated by private
companies who contracted with DHS.17 As of May 3, 2010, there were 256
jails, correctional facilities, and detention centers authorized to detain
persons charged as removable.18
The length of custody varies considerably. In defending the practice of
mandatory detention, the government has previously asserted that the
average length of custody for persons in removal proceedings was fortyseven days, with a thirty day median.19 Even accepting these numbers as the
most probable infringement on a person’s liberty, the potential of being
locked up for a month or a month and a half (even if an individual were to
ultimately prevail in the removal proceedings) creates sufficient deprivation
of liberty to warrant the need for appointed counsel. There is simply not any
comparable legal framework in the United States where an individual is
faced with such deprivation of physical liberty—not to mention the other
fundamental liberties hanging in the balance—without the right to
appointed counsel.
Moreover, the numbers cited by the government in Demore v. Kim, 538
U.S. 510, 529 (2003), provide a skewed picture. As previously noted, the
majority of persons in removal proceedings do not contest the charges
against them, but rather (especially for those in detention) seek to be
removed as quickly as possible. Those who do contest the removal charges,
or seek an application for relief, are subjected to prolonged procedures.
These respondents face prolonged detention that can stretch out over a
period of years. In recognition of the wide scale nature of prolonged
detention in removal proceedings, the Ninth Circuit recently certified a
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circuit-wide class. See Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2010);
Casas-Castrillon v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 946 (9th Cir.
2008) (“As Casas’ case ably demonstrates, aliens challenging an order of
removal may languish in the system for years.”). Even individuals who
prevailed in their removal proceedings have faced years of incarceration.
See e.g., Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006).

V. THE FAILURE OF THE INA AND PREVAILING CASE LAW TO
PROVIDE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In any other context, the enormous liberty interests at stake, the
adversarial framework of the immigration court system, the complexity of
the law, and the extreme imbalance of power would almost certainly lead to
case law providing for the right to assigned counsel. Yet, in removal
proceedings, there have been no such developments.
One of the principal reasons, if not the primary factor, for this failure, is
the statutory “Right to Counsel” enacted by Congress in the INA. The INA
includes a statutory right labeled “Right to Counsel,”20 which, despite its
title, has actually undermined any development to recognize that indigent
respondents in removal proceedings should be entitled to assigned counsel.
The law states:
In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge and in
any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such
removal proceedings, the person concerned shall have the privilege
of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such
counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall
choose.
With those six words, “at no expense to the Government,” the statute has
managed to thwart most efforts by advocates to develop case law providing
for the right to assigned counsel before they even begin. Instead, case law
examining the right to counsel in removal proceedings has focused on
whether the respondents have been advised of their right to pursue legal
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representation at their own expense, whether the immigration judge has
provided them with sufficient time to look for their own counsel, and
whether they received ineffective assistance of counsel.21
Despite the provision expressly denying the right to counsel at
government expense under the INA, there remains a notable absence of case
law exploring the right to assigned counsel based on the Constitution. The
right to assigned counsel in other criminal and civil proceedings was almost
uniformly the result of constitutional challenges, not the result of
Congress’s largesse. Indeed, it would be remarkable if Congress were to
affirmatively act to create the right to assigned counsel for indigent persons
in removal proceedings where case law had not already clarified that
counsel is required in order to safeguard constitutional rights.
In one of the very few federal court cases challenging the lack of
assigned counsel, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that
“[w]here an unrepresented indigent alien would require counsel to present
his position adequately to an immigration judge, he must be provided with a
lawyer at the Government’s expense. Otherwise, ‘fundamental fairness’
would be violated.”22 Interestingly, in the underlying proceeding, the
immigration judge had first rejected the respondent’s request for assigned
counsel, relying on the statutory provision’s qualification, “at no expense to
the Government.” Thus, the immigration judge ruled that the INA
“prevented appointment of counsel at Government expense.”23
The respondent accordingly argued before the Sixth Circuit that the
“Right to Counsel” provision violated his constitutional right to due process
under the law. The court held that, “[t]he test for whether due process
requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent alien is whether, in a
given case, the assistance of counsel would be necessary to provide
fundamental fairness, the touchstone of due process.’”24 In a footnote, the
court recognized that case law from the Supreme Court demonstrated that
fundamental fairness could require appointed counsel.25 Nonetheless, the
court found that his case did not deprive him of due process since he had
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legal counsel on appeal before the Board of Immigration Appeals, and his
lack of representation before the immigration judge did not undermine his
ability, with his current attorney, to present the purely legal question his
case presented on appeal.
The few other courts that have addressed right to counsel challenges in
related contexts have also recognized that fundamental fairness may require
the appointment of counsel. In United States v. Campos-Asencio, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that, while there is no statutory right to
assigned counsel, an individual may successfully argue that deprivation of
assigned counsel in deportation proceedings violated his right to due
process under the law: “[A]n alien has a right to counsel if the absence of
counsel would violate due process under the [F]ifth [A]mendment.”26 In
that case, the appellant had been charged with criminal re-entry after having
been previously deported under Section 276 of the INA.27 Mr. Campos
asserted that the deprivation of counsel in his prior deportation proceeding
violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process under the law. The court
remanded the case to the district court to determine if the deprivation of
counsel resulted in a due process violation.28
It cannot be overemphasized that while the statutory right to counsel fails
to provide counsel at government expense, the federal courts have
recognized that the Constitution provides an independent basis for
determining whether an individual is entitled to assigned counsel. From
Gideon, In re Gault, and Lassiter, the Supreme Court has focused on the
constitutional underpinnings for the right to assigned counsel. The INA’s
statutory provision does not preclude the government from assigning
counsel to indigent persons. Rather, it simply informs the individuals that
they do not have a statutory right under the INA to counsel at government
expense. This does not prohibit the Department of Justice or its delegate,
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”), in its efforts to
ensure fundamental fairness in removal proceedings, from affirmatively
bestowing a safeguard that is not required by the statute. More importantly,

VOLUME 9 • ISSUE 1 • 2010

178 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

the statute does nothing to undermine constitutional claims for assigned
counsel.29

VI. LEGAL ORIENTATION PROGRAMS ARE INADEQUATE
REPLACEMENTS
While neither Congress nor the Department of Justice has taken steps to
provide assigned counsel to indigent respondents in removal proceedings,
the EOIR has followed the lead of non-profit agencies to provide legal
orientation programs to respondents detained at the largest immigration
detention centers. After viewing the results of pilot projects, Congress
appropriated $1 million in fiscal year 2002 to develop and implement the
Legal Orientation Program (“LOP”) for detained respondents.30
Initially, the LOP was focused on six detention centers, including the
detention center in Washington State. By the fiscal year 2008,
appropriations had increased to $3.7 million, allowing the expansion of the
LOP to the twelve principle detention centers, and subsequently included
the LOP for detained juveniles in other facilities.31 The LOP has expanded
significantly from its inception, but the program is still limited to working
only with detained immigrants. Moreover, even with regard to detained
immigrants, in light of the rapid expansion of the detained percentage of
persons in removal proceedings, the LOP is not able to provide resources
for all detained immigrants.32
But an even greater impediment is that the LOP is strictly limited to
group and individual orientation sessions. Indeed, in administering the LOP,
the EOIR apparently views the “Right to Counsel” provision under the INA
as precluding any legal representation, including any legal advice and any
legal practice or preparation of forms, even on a limited pro se basis.33
Thus, the LOP does not provide any resources for direct representation, no
matter how limited in scope: “Program providers are not permitted to use
LOP funds to engage in legal representation.”34 Consequently, the numbers
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of represented respondents remains abysmal, with less than 10 percent of
detained respondents able to obtain legal representation.35
While the LOP provides substantive assistance that is useful for assisting
unrepresented individuals with initially identifying potential forms of relief,
it can in no way compensate for the lack of legal representation. As
previously noted, removal proceedings are complex and adversarial, in each
case the unrepresented individual is pitted against a U.S. trial attorney
trained in immigration law. The imbalance of power is further exacerbated
by the fact that the respondents generally do not speak English and often
have limited education. In addition, without legal representation, most
respondents do not have access to obtain the necessary supporting
documents to appropriately present their cases.
No matter how limited in scope, the LOP provides valuable assistance to
many unrepresented detained respondents. Nonetheless, it can in no way be
credited as providing a viable alternative to legal representation. Even if all
detained respondents in removal proceedings were guaranteed participation
in legal orientation sessions, the overwhelming majority would still be
denied fundamentally fair hearings. Even those respondents who understand
the substance of the basic charges against them or those who are advised
that they may qualify for an application for relief, are left with little or no
understanding of the intricacies of the substantive provisions of the law.
Nor can they generally learn the particulars of the legal process, which are
required to successfully contest charges and present applications for relief.
To the extent that the LOP is viewed as a remedy for ensuring
fundamentally fair hearings to respondents, its implementation is
counterproductive.36 Due process requires that persons receive direct legal
representation in their removal proceedings.

CONCLUSION
For the present, the vast majority of indigent respondents in removal
proceedings are compelled to appear without legal representation. Contrary
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to its title, the “Right to Counsel” provision in Section 292 of the INA (8
U.S.C. § 1362) has actually undermined the right to counsel in removal
proceedings by expressly stating that there is no statutory right to assigned
counsel. However, given the enormous interests that are at stake in removal
proceedings and the sharp imbalance of powers created by the indisputably
complex and adversarial nature of the proceedings, constitutional case law
provides a framework to assert the right to assigned counsel. As noted, two
circuits have already recognized that in some cases, the “absence of counsel
would violate due process under the [F]ifth [A]mendment.”37 The
framework currently in place, especially governing those placed in
detention during removal proceedings, provides ample opportunities for
advocates to demonstrate cases where the absence of assigned counsel has
indeed violated due process.
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